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CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN
COMPARISON:
DO WE CURE A MARKET FAILURE
OR A SOCIAL PROBLEM?©
By JOHANNA NIEMI-KIEsILAiNEN*
The Continental European and Scandinavian
bankruptcy laws did not have provisions enabling the
discharge of debt until quite recently. While bankruptcy
law did not specifically exclude consumer debtors, in
the absence of discharge, consumer bankruptcy was
meaningless and rare. After the deregulation of credit
markets in the 1980s, many west European countries
faced a huge increase in consumer debt problems.
Several countries passed consumer debt adjustment
laws during the late 1980s and 1990s. Unlike the North
American consumer bankruptcy laws, the European
laws attach moral attributes to the access to adjustment
procedures, which require a mandatory payment plan,
and offer debt counselling. This article argues that the
European laws reflect an understanding of
overindebtedness as a social problem, rather than as a
market failure.
Jusqu'5 r6cemment, les lois de la faillite de l'Europe
continental et de la Scandinavie ne contenaient pas de
clauses permettant la d6charge de la dette. Tandis que
la loi sur la faillite n'excluait pas des consommateurs
d6biteurs, en absence de d6charge, la faillite de
consommateurs 6tait insignifiante et rare. Apres la
dereglement des marches de cr6dits dans les annees
1980, plusicurs pays europ6ens ont dQ faire face A une
augmentation 6norme dans les probl~mes de d6bit.
Certains pays ont pass6 la Ioi de l'ajustement des d6bits
de consommateurs vers la fin des ann6es 1980 et 1990.
Contrairement aux lois nord-am6ricaines sur la faillite
des consommateurs, les lois europeennes attachent des
attributs moraux a I'acc s aux procedures d'ajustement,
qui exige un plan de paiement obligatoire, et offre des
conseils sur le d6bit. L'article argumente que les lois
europ6ennes refletent une compr6hension du
surendettement comme un probl~me social plutet que
comme un problime de faillite de march6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Comparative research in consumer bankruptcy law, as scarce as
it is, seems to be more interesting than ever before. While the European
jurisdictions have been influenced by the Anglo-Saxon "fresh start"
policies in their search for new approaches to consumer debt problems,'
the Americans are now discussing "means testing" and mandatory
counselling, both of which have recently been introduced in European
jurisdictions.
In its 1997 report, the United States National Bankruptcy
Review Commission launched a discussion on "means testing" in
consumer bankruptcy, that is, requiring debtors with an adequate
income to pay part of their debt as a condition of discharge.2 Although
the majority of the Commission remained faithful to the principle of an
efficient "fresh start" and open access to discharge, the minority
proposed means testing. Subsequent discussions and two bills in
Congress in 1997-1998 have concentrated on this topic.3 Neither of the
1 American consumer bankruptcy law has been the focus of much European scholarly interest
during the last two decades: see, for example, H.-P. Ackmann, Schuldbefreiung durch Konkurs?
(Schriften zum deutschen und europhischen Zivil-, Handels- und Prozessrecht 96, 1983); K.
Mezinger, Das freie Nachforderungsrecht der Konkursgliiubiger, Fragwirdigkeit und Grenzen
(Schriften zum Bfirgerlichen Recht 75, 1982); B. Knfillig-Dingeldey, Nachforderungsrecht oder
Schuldbefreiung (G6ttinger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien 127, 1984); and N.J.H. Huls,
"Alternatives to Personal Bankruptcy" in G. H6rmann, ed., Consumer Credit and Consumer
Insolvency (Bremen: Universitat Bremen, 1986) 289. Additionally, European consumer debt
adjustment bills frequently include a discussion of American consumer bankruptcy policy.
2 See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, Final
Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), online: National Bankruptcy
Review Commission <http:llwww.nbrc.gov/reportcont.html> (date accessed: 16 July 1999). The
majority of the Commission did not fully discuss means testing.
3 See Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); and
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301,105th Cong. (1997).
1999] Consumer Bankruptcy: Market Failure or Social Problem? 475
bills was adopted by Congress in 1998, but the discussion is far from
over.
While American consumer bankruptcy law has long been
acknowledged as the most generous in the world, the European
bankruptcy laws did not include any provisions for discharge at all until
quite recently. However, the economic crisis at the beginning of this
decade created such insurmountable economic difficulties for so many
households that the European states felt forced to seek new solutions.
Several European countries have enacted new consumer bankruptcy (or
debt adjustment) legislation in the 1990s.
The European consumer bankruptcy laws differ from the Anglo-
Saxon laws in at least three important respects. 4 First, European
legislatures have not adopted open access to consumer bankruptcy. On
the contrary, access is restricted to those debtors deemed worthy of it.
Because of this attitude, there is a tendency in Europe to attach moral
attributes to consumer overindebtedness and access to debt adjustment
programs.
Second, and equally important, is the insistence on a mandatory
payment plan for all consumer debtors. The discharge is either
conditional or is not granted before the completion of the payment plan,
the duration of which varies from five to seven years. No provisions exist
for a straight discharge. The function of the plan is not only economic;
rather, it is intended to ensure that the adjustment procedure is not an
"easy way out." This is best illustrated by the fact that even poor debtors,
who are not in a position to contribute to the plan, are technically put
under the plan for several years.
Third, the European model puts special emphasis on debt
counselling services. Counselling aims at the rehabilitation of the debtor,
and economic education and lifestyle adjustments, but also at fuller
repayment of the debts. The debt counselling services are an integral
part of the debt adjustment procedure. How this is accomplished varies
among European jurisdictions, but generally the debt adjustment laws
require that, before filing for judicial consumer bankruptcy or debt
adjustment, the European consumer debtor must take part in debt
counselling and negotiations or mediation with creditors in order to
solve his or her debt problem.
4 These distinctive characteristics can be used to construct a European model of consumer
bankruptcy: see N.J.H. Huls, "Overindebtedness and Overlegalization: Consumer Bankruptcy as a
Field for Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 143; and N.J.H. Huls et aL,
Overindebtedness of Consumers in the EC Member States: Facts and Search for Solutions (Bruxelles:
Story Scientia, 1994) [hereinafter Overindebtedness of Consumers in the EC].
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Compared with the American consumer bankruptcy regime, the
differences are so fundamental that they justify a different terminology.
In the following discussion, I refer to the Anglo-Saxon institution as
"consumer bankruptcy" and to the European approach as "consumer
debt adjustment."5
Because of the current discussions about "means testing" in the
United States, American consumer bankruptcy experts may have a
special interest in understanding what mandatory payment plans and
restricted access mean in Europe, and how these institutions work there.
Therefore, Part III of this article includes a description of the European
consumer bankruptcy laws, with a special emphasis on Scandinavia,
where these laws have now been in operation for several years. First,
however, I wish to discuss the different ideologies animating the North
American and the European consumer bankruptcy regimes.
II. TWO PARADIGMS OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
A. Consumer Bankruptcy in the Open Credit Economy
The fundamental philosophy supporting American bankruptcy
laws was persuasively and eloquently laid down by the Bankruptcy Laws
Commission in 1973.6 Essentially, it is a moral regime with an emphasis
on a second chance and a fresh start policy. At the same time, the
Commission's starting point was acceptance of, and adherence to, the
notion of an open credit economy. 7 The Commission saw credit as a
beneficial social institution, both from the individual's and from society's
point of view. According to the Commission, credit furthers economic
growth and increases individuals' well-being, and both goals are better
served if consumers are inclined to take risks. A basic function of
bankruptcy is therefore to serve the credit markets. While access to the
5 A common translation of the European terms is "rescheduling of debts." It is found, for
example, in European Current Law Monthly Digest (January 1999) at 194. The translated term,
however, disguises the fact that all European laws, except those in France, allow for the discharge of
a substantial part of the consumer's debts. See also J. Niemi-Kiesiliiinen, "Changing Directions in
Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Practice in Europe and USA" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 133 at
135.
6 See Bankruptcy Laws Commission, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-173 (1973).
7 1bid. at 68.
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credit market should be easy and open, open access to bankruptcy as an
exit from the market is equally important.8
In addition, bankruptcy should lead to a fair and equitable
distribution of assets among creditors, efficient and economic
administration of estates, and the deterrence and punishment of fraud
and abuse.9 The last-mentioned goals are, of course, uncontroversial.
From a comparative perspective, the narrow definition of deterrence is
noteworthy. The practices the lawmakers wanted to discourage were
defined narrowly in the enumeration of exceptions to the right of a
discharge, leading either to the dismissal of the application for discharge
for all debtsO or only for a particular debt.11 Only one exception, the
abuse of the bankruptcy process, 12 is formulated broadly in the United
States Bankruptcy Code, but it has not been widely used in practice.
Much consumer bankruptcy research relies on the law-and-
economics paradigm, which views bankruptcy mainly as an institution for
risk allocation. Since the typical risks in the consumer credit market (i.e.,
loss of income because of lay-offs, downsizing, and illness) are
unforeseeable, they should, according to the theory, be allocated to the
party who is in a better position to bear the risk-the commercial lender.
Even where the consumer has better information about the risk (such as
the borrower's own over-commitment), some theorists would impose the
loss on the institutional lender because of the lender's superior ability to
diversify and calculate the risks.13
Given that the typical risks in the consumer credit market are
beyond the reach of bankruptcy law, law-and-economics bankruptcy
scholarship has focused on the variables in bankruptcy law that may
8 ibid. at 75-76.
9 Ibid. at 75-83.
10 See especially United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§727, 707 (1998) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Code].
11 Ibid. § 523(a).
12 Ibid. § 707.
13 See, for example, F. Weston, "Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of
Bankruptcy" (1977) 41 L. & Contemp. Probs. 47 at 56; T.H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 229; and M. Howard, "A
Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy" (1987) 48 Ohio St. L.J. 1047 at 1064. On the other
hand, Theodore Eisenberg regards the debtor as a better risk bearer because he or she can avoid
the risk: see T. Eisenberg, "Bankruptcy Law in Perspective" (1981) 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953 at 983.
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affect the debtor's decision to file for bankruptcy, such as exemptions' 4
and incentives to repay debt through a plan. Consequently, much of the
American empirical consumer bankruptcy research has focused on the
debtor's choice between a Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filing, and on
evaluating the incentives created by the law for the debtor to choose a
Chapter 13 payment plan.
Another group of scholars takes a socio-legal view of consumer
bankruptcy.15 They maintain that what is needed is comprehensive
empirical information about consumer debtors, their debt problems and
reasons for filing for bankruptcy, and the operation of consumer credit
markets; decisions on bankruptcy law and policy, they believe, should be
based on that information.1 6
Both sets of scholars base their approaches on a notion of
consumer bankruptcy as an institution for the regulation of the
consumer credit market. The law-and-economics discipline is optimistic
about the ability of bankruptcy law to modify debtors' behaviour,
whereas the socio-legal school tends to be pessimistic about the remedial
powers of bankruptcy law. Instead, the socio-legal school emphasizes the
impact of larger economic forces, economic fluctuations, and
unemployment, which cause debtors and their families financial distress
and lead them to file for bankruptcy.
14 See M.J. White, "Economic Versus Sociological Approaches to Legal Research: The Case
of Bankruptcy," Book Review of As We Forgive ours Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in
America by T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren, & J.L. Westbrook (1991) 25 L. & Soc'y Rev. 685 at 688.
Empirical research comparing different American states does not support the popular belief that
the level of exemptions affects the level of consumer bankruptcies: see L. Shepard, "Personal
Failures and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978" (1984) 7 J. L. & Econ. 419 at 424-25; W.J.
Woodward Jr. & R.S. Woodward, "Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Study" (1983) 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 53; T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, As We
Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989) at 241 [hereinafter As We Forgive Our Debtors]; and P. Shuchman & T.L. Rhorer,
"Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings and Other Purposes" (1982) 56 Am. Bankr. L.J.
1. The severity of wage garnishment seems to affect the frequency of consumer bankruptcies: see P.
Shuchman, "Social Science Research on Bankruptcy," Book Review ofAs We Forgive Ours Debtors:
Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America by T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook (1990)
43 Rutgers L. Rev. 185 at 235 [hereinafter "Social Science Research on Bankruptcy"].
15 About the different paradigms of consumer bankruptcy law and the controversy between
them, see White, supra note 14, andAs We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 14 at 230.
16 See, for example, As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 14. The work of Philip Shuchman
has increased empirical knowledge of bankruptcy debtors and the reasons they end up in
bankruptcy: see "Social Science Research on Bankruptcy" supra note 14.
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B. The Economic and Legal Background of the
European Debt Adjustment System
European thinking seems to come closest to the socio-legal view.
Research and legislation in different European countries tend to
emphasize the causes of overindebtedness, such as economic recessions,
unemployment, business failures, personal misfortunes such as illness,
and inability to manage one's budget. Consequently, the
overindebtedness of private households is seen primarily as a social
problem, not as a market failure. Recently, this view was expounded by a
representative of the European Union (Eu), who characterized
overindebtedness as a social and health problem involving individuals,
rather than implicating consumer protection policy or other market
regulation. 7 However, this understanding of the reasons for
overindebtedness, which is shared with the American socio-legal school,
leads to a completely different concept of discharge that can only be
understood from an historical perspective.
Nineteenth century bankruptcy laws were still in force in most
European countries at the beginning of the 1980s. The continental
bankruptcy laws did not contain any discharge provisions at all. Non-
business bankruptcies were rare. English bankruptcy law had discharge
provisions, but bankruptcy was not accessible to ordinary consumers or
other non-business debtors.l8
The debt problems of households were not on the political
agenda either. Admittedly, some individual debtors had excessive debt
loads, mostly arising out of unsuccessful businesses. How these cases
were handled has never been properly examined, but creditors may have
used several strategies. Credit institutions pursued their claims in due
17 See J. Ring, "What is the EU Doing to Deal with Overindebtedness?" (The European
Conference on Money and Debt Advice, Guarantee Foundation, Hilmeenlinna, Finland, 3-5
September 1997) in S. Helesuo, ed., Debt Advice Networking: Ways Forward, (Helsinki: Guarantee
Foundation, 1997) 10 at 12. The European Union (Eu) has not taken a stand on debt adjustment
law and policy, but it has funded research on the topic.
18 Historically, bankruptcy and discharge were not accessible to private persons (i.e., non-
traders). The formal restriction was abolished in 1869, but, because of high costs, bankruptcy never
became popular among English consumers. The debt administration order, a debt adjustment
procedure, was created in 1883, but it never gained the same popularity as the American consumer
bankruptcy. The debt administration order requires a mandatory payment plan, and plans have
been very long: see U.K., Civil Justice Review: Report of the Review Body on Civil Justice, Cmnd 394
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988). The debt administration procedure is regulated in
the County Courts Act of 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 28, ss. 112-17. It was amended in 1990 to make the
order more favourable to the debtor: see Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (U.K.), 1990, c. 41, s.
13. The amendment is not yet in force.
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order, sometimes causing formal bankruptcy of the debtor, and wrote off
the debts. The legal prescription periods for private debts were
long-thirty years in Germany, for example, and ten years in many other
countries-and could be renewed an unlimited number of times. It is
assumed, however, that many creditors wrote off the debt after
recognizing that further enforcement efforts would be futile. Tax
authorities and other public or semi-public creditors took the same
position, but these debts usually had shorter prescription periods and
were not subject to renewal.
Even less is known about what happened to the debtors. Some
resumed their careers or businesses and prospered, while others left the
labour force and lived on the margins of society with the help of welfare
payments or through illegal activities. Some debtors took up paid work;
however, that could be very frustrating for them, since salaries were easy
to trace and subject to garnishment, perhaps for the rest of their lives.
Nevertheless, the number of these debtors was so small that there was
no political pressure to change the debt enforcement legislation before
the recession at the beginning of the 1990s.
To understand the background of the new laws properly, I must
briefly describe the economic situation at the beginning of the 1990s,
and the welfare state structure of European countries. The economic
cycle before consumer debt adjustment laws were enacted was
essentially similar in each country. The consumer credit markets were
strictly regulated until the 1980s. Because of careful screening of credit
applicants and the fact that demand for credit exceeded supply, default
was rare. The credit markets were rapidly deregulated during the 1980s,
which led to an increased supply of credit to consumers. Because
unsatisfied demand had accumulated during the regulatory period, the
credit market expanded rapidly. It is estimated that in several European
countries, the total outstanding volume of consumer credit doubled
during the 1980s.19
When the recession started at the turn of the decade, the rise in
unemployment affected already heavily indebted households. Home
mortgages played a big role in countries that favour private home-
ownership such as France, Great Britain, Norway, and Finland. Real
estate values rose in the 1980s and fell in the 1990s. Also, many well-
educated middle-class individuals were "downsized" or lost their small
businesses. Often family members, wives, and cohabitees had given
19 In southern European countries, the same development is taking place ten years later: see,
for example, S.M. Pereira, "Debt in Portugal" in Helesuo, ed., supra note 17, 35; and M.
Mousouraki, "Overindebtedness in Greece," in Helesuo, ed., supra note 17, 39.
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personal guarantees for business loans and were sucked into the
economic crisis. Business debts and mortgages played a substantial part
in the private debt crisis. Even if credit card liabilities and purchase
money debts are present in most cases of overindebtedness, consumer
credit in the strict sense did not play a decisive role in the debt crisis of
the 1990s.
The new middle-class debtors, unlike the poor, could pursue
their grievances effectively and created political pressure for measures to
alleviate the burden of excessive debt. Legislators saw the unexpected
loss of income because of unemployment or similar reasons as the main
cause for overindebtedness. This assumption was supported by research
that showed that consumer debt problems were related to
unemployment, loss of income because of illness, and low-income
families with many children2O (although this research did not completely
reflect the new debtors' reality). The new debtors were unemployed,
true, but they were not necessarily in lower social or income groups, and
had often been self-employed or had a self-employed family member.21
To understand the background of the new debt adjustment laws,
one must also appreciate the welfare and security expectations in
European societies of the late 1980s. There was a common expectation
that well-developed welfare societies protect people in the event of
illness or unemployment. However, the traditional unemployment
benefits were both insufficient and inadequate to help people with
excessive debt loads, and new measures were called for. Therefore, the
debt adjustment laws were seen as part of the welfare state protection.
20 See, for example, K. Holzscheck et al., Praxis des Konsumentenkredits-eine empirische
Untersuchung zur Rechtssoziologie und 6konomie des Konsumentenkredits (K61n: Bundesanzeiger,
1982) at 338; G. Parker, Getting and Spending, Credit and Debt in Britain (Avebury: Gower, 1990) at
157; R. Berthoud & E. Kempson, Credit and Debt The PSI Report (London: Policy Studies Institute,
1992) at 110; P. Conaty, "The Need for Money Advice Centres" in H6rmann, ed., supra note 1, 321;
M. Adler, "The Economic and Social Situation of Consumer Debtors in Great Britain" in
H6rmann, ed., supra note 1, 37; and J. Leskinen, Use of Consumer Credit in the Context of the
Consumer's Way of Life and Personal Situations (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1990).
21 According to the empirical studies, the debt adjustment debtors are often unemployed,
have large total debts, have been self-employed or have a family member who has been self-
employed, and have large business debts: for Sweden, see Utviirdering av skuldsaneringslagen,
Konsumentverket 1995/96:31, 16; for France, see J.-J. Hyest & P. Loridant, Commission des lois et
Commission des Finances, Rapport d'information n' 60-Surendettement Privenir et Guirir
(1997/1998), online: S6nat <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r97-060/r97-060_mono.html> (date accessed:
23 August 1999) [hereinafter Rapport d'information]; and, for Finland, see J. Tala et al.,
Velkajdrjestelyt tuomioistuimissa (Helsinki: National Research Institute of Legal Policy, 1994); and
V. Muttilainen & J. Tala, Kuka vapautuu veloistaan (Helsinki: National Research Institute of Legal
Policy, 1998).
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How does this description help us to understand the European
model of debt adjustment? First, it was natural to restrict access to debt
adjustments to those debtors who were hit by social risks similar to those
from which the welfare state ordinarily protects its citizens: that is,
unemployment, illness, and unexpected disability. Second, the idea of
economic rehabilitation was not tied to the goal of a quick economic
recovery and re-entry to the credit market. Participation in the credit
market was not deemed'necessary, and was perhaps not even desirable.
On the contrary, economic recovery was intended to secure partial
repayment of old debt through the payment plan. Third, debt adjustment
was perceived as a remedy to the problems that led to the
overindebtedness. Through counselling, the welfare state is given a
chance to help.
The relationship between the debt adjustment law and the credit
market is defined in several European bills. According to them, the new
law should interfere with the functioning of the credit market as little as
possible, if at all. For example, the Swedish bill for Debt Adjustment
Law indicates, both in words and spirit, that a basic function of the law is
to uphold the obligation to pay one's debts.22 Some bills emphasize that
the aim is only to discharge such debts as the debtor would never be able
to repay.23 All European bills emphasize that the law must not
undermine the general moral imperative of paying one's debts.
III. THE EUROPEAN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAWS
A. Overview
The first European country to introduce a specific procedure for
consumer debt adjustments and debt discharge was Denmark, in 1984.
The Danish law was an important example for the other Scandinavian
countries when they drafted their laws. Laws on judicial debt adjustment
for consumers entered into force in Finland and Norway in 1993, and in
Sweden in 1994.
22 See Regeringens proposition 1993/1994:123 Skuldsaneringslag, 36 [hereinafter Reg. Prop.
1993/1994.123].
23 See Bet 957/1982, Betcenkning om gceldssanering, 76 (the Danish bill for debt adjustment)
[hereinafter Bet 957/1982]; and Regeringens proposition 18311993, Hallituksen esitys laiksi
yksityishenkil6n velkajdrjestelystd, 22 (Finnish bill for the Judicial Debt Adjustment Act) [hereinafter
Reg. Prop. 18311993].
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The French law on prevention and regulation of individual and
household overindebtedness was enacted in 1989, but its provisions on
discharge are limited. The British Debt Administration Order, available
to consumers, was substantially reformed and modernized in 1990. In
Austria, legislation was adopted in 1994, and in the Netherlands in
1997.24 The German insolvency reform Act was amended during its
passage in the German Parliament to include a chapter on consumer
insolvency. Although adopted in 1994, this Act did not come into force
until 1999.
B. Consumer Protection and Prevention in France
Unlike other continental European countries, France first
introduced bankruptcy discharge in business bankruptcy law as a part of
a comprehensive insolvency law reform in 1985. Thus, when the French
Act to prevent and regulate overindebtedness of individuals and
families, known as Loi Neierz,25 was enacted in 1989, the problem of
overindebted households was seen in the context of consumer
protection. Loi Neierz does not, however, contain a discharge provision
that comes anywhere near the Anglo-Saxon concept of discharge.
Instead, the law provides a framework for rescheduling the payment of
debts, and its discharge provisions apply only after a grace period.
Institutionally, the law created administrative commissions to
administer the rescheduling of debts. The commissions consist of
representatives of the Banque de France, local banks, consumer groups,
and local governments. The debtor files a rescheduling application with
the commission, which then makes extensive inquiries into the debtor's
affairs, facilitates negotiations with the creditors, and sets up a plan for
acceptance by the parties (plan conventionel). The commission's aim is to
win the creditors' support and to avoid court proceedings.26 If the plan is
not accepted, the debtor may go to court. In that case, the commission
24 The Dutch law was consolidated to the bankruptcy law in 1988; Bankruptcy Act 1998 (June
25) Stb 445; and Bankruptcy of Natural Persons (Procedure) Act 1998 (June 25) Stb 447.
25 See Loi 89-1010 relative ti la privention et au raglement des difficultas lijes au surendettement
des particuliers et des familles, in force 1 March 1990. In 1993, the provisions were incorporated in
the Consumer Protection Act as articles L.331-1-L.333-8.
26 The success of the rescheduling is measured as a proportion of the filings that led to
acceptance of the plan conventionel. The acceptance rate increased from 45 per cent in 1990 to
nearly 70 per cent in 1996: see Rapport dinformation, supra note 21 at 9,44.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 37 NOS. I & 2
proposes a plan to the court.27 At any point in the proceedings, if the
commission's negotiations are hampered by a creditor's execution
measures, the court may order a stay.
Access to the rescheduling proceedings was originally intended
to be open to all consumer debtors. However, fraud, the provision of
incorrect information to creditors or the commission, and conduct
prejudicial to the creditor's interests all exclude debtors from
participating in the proceedings. The French Parliament also added a
good faith test (de bonnefoi). The interpretation of "good faith" was left
to the commissions and the courts, and has been a major ground for the
dismissal of applications.28 Most applications, however, have been held
admissible.29
The law enumerates the options that the commissions and the
courts have at their disposal. The most important limitation on the
court's power is that the capital of the debt may not be reduced. The
only exception to this principle is that the court may, after a forced sale
of a family home, discharge the remaining part of the debt.30 With
respect to other debts, the court has the power to grant an extension of
time, adjust the interest rate, and order payments to be credited to
capital before being credited to interest. Also, payment of a debt may be
rescheduled for up to one-and-one-half times the original repayment
period, or a maximum of five years. The average length of the plans has
been nearly ten years. 31
These provisions are not sufficient to help debtors who have no,
or very little, capacity to pay. Several studies show that 25-40 per cent of
debtors fall into this category.32 Lack of payment capacity does not make
a filing inadmissible, and so the Commissions have established the
27 The procedures were slightly modified toward a three stage procedure by Loi 95-125 (8
February 1995). If the Commission does not agree to present a plan, but recommends the dismissal
of the application, the debtor may appeal to the court.
28 Regarding the interpretation of de bonnefoi, see G. Paisant, "Chroniques de legislation et
de jurisprudence francaises, Surendettement des particuliers" (1991) Rev. trim. dr. com. 446; and D.
Desurvire, Histoire de la banqueroute etfaillite contemporaine (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992) at 169-70.
29 About 90 per cent of the filings were found admissible: see Rapport d'information, supra
note 21 at 35.
30 About one-half of the cases had home mortgage debts, but the debt was reduced in only 10
per cent of the cases: see ibid. at 18, 38.
31 Theplan conventionel, accepted in the first stage of the procedure, has had an average
duration of more than ten years (123 months). The plans confirmed by the court have been shorter
(ninety months, or seven-and-one-half years): see ibid. at 39.
32 See ibiL at 42.
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practice of granting consecutive grace periods to indigent debtors.33
Since their situation rarely changes during the moratorium period, cases
kept coming back to the Commissions. As a result of the amendment of
1998,34 a discharge is possible after a three year grace period for debtors
with no payment capacity.
Loi Neierz is considered a success, and the number of filings
reached 90,000 during the first ten months after it came into force in
1990. In the period between 1991 and 1994, filings levelled off at the rate
of 68,000 per year.3 5 The subsequent rise to 95,700 in 1997 is attributed
to the practice of granting moratoria, which led to repeated applications
by the same debtors.
C. The German and Austrian Laws
Debate over revision of the German bankruptcy law of 1877
went on for decades3 6 The discharge of debt was not a central theme in
the reform discussions. The Insolvency Law Review Commission (1986)
had business failures in mind when it proposed that composition
agreements by insolvent debtors should be made easier.37 Before the
proposal went forward, restrictions on post-bankruptcy enforcement of
pre-bankruptcy debts were adopted in an East German law enacted only
six months before the unification in 1989.38
The final bill for the new Insolvency Law (Insolvenzgesetz),
adopted by the unified Germany in 1991, included a detailed regulation
33 The commissions granted a moratorium in 28 per cent of the cases; the courts did likewise
in more than one-half of the cases: see ibid. at 44.
34 See Loin. 98-657 (29 July 1998).
35 See Rapport d'information, supra note 21 at 15.
3 6 Konkursgesetz von 1877 was replaced by lnsovenzordnung 5.10.1994, which came into force 1
January 1999. For a discussion of this reform, see W. Uhlenbruck, ed., Einhundert Jahre
Konkursordnung 1877-1977 (K61n: Heyman, 1977).
37 The reform discussions were concerned about the drastically decreased number of
compositions. Compositions, both in and outside bankruptcy, were regulated by the
Vergleichverordnung of 1932, and were almost nonexistent in bankruptcy in the 1980s: see C.
Doehring, "Das Insolvenzgesehen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit neueren statistischen
Ergebnissen" (1989) 50 KTS 825 at 827. The Insolvency Law Review Commission tried to make
composition-type agreements feasible as part of a bankruptcy proceeding: see Kommission fiir
Insolvenzrecht, Bundesministerium Justiz, Erster Bericht 134-136 (1985); and Zweiter Bericht 150-
163 (1986).
38 This law, Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung 6.6.1990, was in force until 1999 in the territory of
former East Germany: see G.-A. Liibchen & H.-G. Landfermann, "Das neue Insolvenzrecht der
DDR" (1990) ZIP 829 at 837-38.
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of discharge and payment plan, but only for insolvent businesses.39 Until
then, the reform discussions had paid little attention to debt counselling
practised by consumer and charitable organizations, churches, and
unions. These organizations had been trying to persuade the politicians
to allocate more funding for counselling, and to establish a separate debt
rescheduling procedure for consumers.40 During the parliamentary
hearings on the Insolvency Act, the opposition Social Democratic Party
made a proposal along these lines. The basic elements of that proposal
were then incorporated in the Insolvency Act.
Consequently, the new Insolvency Act,41 adopted in 1994, has a
two-track discharge procedure. One track, the small debtor adjustment,
is designed for consumers and individuals operating a small business.
The other track is available to bankrupts as a means to end bankruptcy
proceedings. The conditions of discharge are quite different in each
proceeding.
The small debtor's primary obligation is to negotiate with his or
her creditors before and during the proceedings. The first stage of the
proceedings is called the "small process" (Kleinverfahren). The debt
counsellors' new responsibility will be to guide these negotiations and
report about them to the courts. The debtor is likely to need assistance,
because he or she is required to attach a complete payment proposal to
the application. The court confirms the plan if it is accepted by a
majority of the creditors or if there is no creditor opposition.
The bankruptcy track (Restschuldbefreiung) follows different
principles. Creditors' acceptance of the plan is not necessary. The
discharge proceedings follow the normal bankruptcy course. Discharge
may be denied because of economic crime, other fraud, or conduct
injurious to creditors' interests. Access to the proceedings, however, only
confers the right to start a payment plan. The duration of the payment
plan is seven years, and there are no exceptions. The payment
obligations under the plan correspond to the garnishment provisions,
and leave the debtor with only enough money to live at a basic
subsistence level. During the three last years of the plan the payment
39 See Diskussionsentwurf Gesezt zur Reform des Insolvenzrechts. Allgemeine Begriindung 27
(1988) [hereinafter Diskussionsentvurf]; and Regierungsentwurf einer neuen Insolvenzordnung vore
21.IL1991 (Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 1262443, 15.4.1992) at 81 (the German bill to revise
the insolvency law) [hereinafter Regierungsentwur].
40 See Institut ffr Finanzdienstleistungen und Verbraucherschutz im Aufirag der
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Freien Wohlfartspflege e V. und der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
Verbraucherverbinde e. V, Gutachten zum Entwurf des Verbraucherkonkurs (1990) [hereinafter
Gutachten].
41 See Insolvenzordnung 5.10.1994, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I, 2866. In force 1 January 1999.
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obligations are reduced. The debtor is under the surveillance of the
trustee and creditors during the plan, not only regarding his or her
repayment behaviour, but also with respect to his or her obligation to
find employment and to keep working. In the discharge hearing upon
the completion of the plan creditors can still oppose the discharge if the
debtor has not fulfilled the plan obligations.
Critics objected that the bankruptcy track was too harsh.42 The
creation of separate proceedings for small debtors provides a partial
answer to this critique. These proceedings, however, leave the small
debtor at the mercy of creditors. If the creditors do not accept the
proposal, the debtor may file for bankruptcy. It is unlikely that the
creditors would accept a more lenient plan than the bankruptcy option
provides for.
In Austria, a consumer debt adjustment regime was introduced
in 1993 with an amendment to the bankruptcy law.43 As a result, the
provisions for a composition in bankruptcy were relaxed for private
debtors and a five-year plan with a minimum requirement of 30 per cent
repayment becomes binding if it is accepted by a three-quarters majority
of creditors.
A specific debt adjustment procedure was also introduced. 44 The
debtor may file for a debt adjustment at the same time as the bankruptcy
filing, but the adjustment proceeding only starts after the composition
plan that the debtor presented has been rejected. Pre-bankruptcy
negotiations are not strictly mandatory, but, to obtain a waiver of the
bankruptcy fee, the debtor must present a certificate that pre-bankruptcy
negotiations have taken place with the creditors.
After the debtor has negotiated twice with the creditors, the
court determines the special conditions of the adjustment. The debtor
cannot make use of the adjustment regime in cases of fraud or other
conduct injurious to the creditors, where an adjustment procedure
occurred within the last twenty years, or where the debtor incurred
unreasonable debts during the last three years.
42 See a comment by a group of bankruptcy lawyers, Gravenbrucher Kreis, "Grosse
Insolvenzrechtsreform gescheitert" (1990) ZIP 476 at 478; see also Gutachten, supra note 40 at 82;
U. Reifner, "Grunds~itze zur Bewertung des Verbraucherkonkurses" in Verbraucher und Recht
(1990) 132; and, from a banking perspective, F.J. Scholz, "Insolvenzverfahren ffir Verbraucher aus
der Sichtes Bankenfachverbandes (BKG)" in Insolvenzverfahren Pbr Verbraucher - mit oder ohne
Restschuldbefreiung (BKG ed. 1988) 23 at 27.
43 See Konkursordnungsnovelle 1993 (BGB1 974). In force 1 January 1995.
4 4 See Absch6pfungsverfahren mit Restschulbefreiung, Konkursordnung § 199-216.
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The plan runs for seven years and is equivalent to a wage
garnishment. The debtor may apply for a discharge after three years
have elapsed and if 50 per cent of the total debt has been paid; after
seven years with a 10 per cent minimum repayment; or on the basis of
special hardship after ten years.45 Payments are administered by a
trustee, and the debtor is under the surveillance of the trustee and the
creditors regarding his or her employment, domicile, and other
circumstances.
D. The Unknown Path Breaker: Danish DebtArrangementAct of 1984
The Danish bankruptcy law was amended in 1984 to include debt
adjustments for consumers. 46 The Debt Arrangement Act was endorsed
by all parties in the Danish legislature, and still enjoys great popularity.
Unfortunately, no extensive empirical research about it exists. 47 Even
the Act itself was not widely known outside the country before the
beginning of the 1990s, when delegations from other Scandinavian
countries started to tour Denmark.
The Danish preparatory committee discussed the meagre
prospects of an overindebted debtor and examined the collection efforts
by the creditors. 48 Its conclusion was that the discharge of "hopeless"
debts would cause no remarkable loss to any party. In the committee's
view, society would benefit from a discharge in various ways. In addition
to the advantages to the debtor and his or her family, the debtor's
economic recovery and increased motivation to work could benefit
society through savings in social security and increase in tax flow. Even
creditors might save futile enforcement costs and would benefit from
their share of the payment plan.
The crucial question, then, was how to spot the "hopeless" debt
for discharge. The Danish Act leaves the discretion largely to the courts.
The preconditions of the arrangement, according to the Act, are the
debtor's insolvency and overall circumstances. The insolvency
requirement is usually met if the debtor has total debts of at least
45 See F. Mohr, Das Ptivatkonkurs (Wein: Manz, 1994) at 65-69.
46 The amendment of the Danish Bankruptcy Code, Konkurslov (part IV, Goeldsanering S.
197-237) came into force 1 July 1984 [hereinafter Konkurslovj.
47 For an overview in English, see P. Mogelvang-Hansen, "Adjustment of Hopeless Debt"
(Third European Conference on Overindebtedness, Birmingham, 4-5 December 1992) in Consumer
Debt in Europe-The Birmingham Declaration (Birmingham: Birmingham Settlement, 1993) at 85.
48 See Bet 957/1982, supra note 23.
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250,000 Danish crowns (US$40,000) if employed, or 100,000 crowns
(US$15,000) if unemployed or retired. Also, the court has to take into
consideration
whether the overall circumstances of the debtor speak in favour of the arrangement, such
as the debtor's interest in the arrangement, the age of the debts, the origin of the debts,
the debtor's circumstances when the debts were incurred, the repayment history of the
debts, and the debtor's circumstances while the application is pending.49
These general terms have been elaborated in court practice to
reflect Danish public policy goals. In court practice, the debt adjustment
is denied if the debtor is likely to incur new debts; if he or she is
expecting to inherit money in the near future; if the debts are of recent
origin or derive from criminal acts, speculative businesses, or
extravagant consumption; or if the debtor has systematically neglected to
pay taxes or to pay alimony. The discharge is to be denied if the debtor
does not honestly disclose his or her affairs and does not comply with
other orders of the court.50
The debtor takes the initiative in proposing a payment plan. If
the debtor is unemployed or retired, a straight discharge is possible. The
Danish legislature envisaged that a zero-payment plan would be
exceptional, but the practice has been more liberal. The duration of the
plan is usually five years, and longer for student loans. All unsecured
creditors are on the same footing. The few priorities acknowledged in
the Danish bankruptcy law do not apply to consumer debt arrangements.
The debtor is required to pay the debts from that part of his or
her income that exceeds the necessary costs of living for the debtor's
family. The essential living costs are determined on the same basis as the
minimum social security payable by the state. Secured debts are outside
the adjustment. The debtor is sometimes allowed to keep the family
home and to make the mortgage payments during the plan, but the
payments may not exceed reasonable alternative housing costs.
Even though the debt arrangement is regulated in Danish
bankruptcy law, the debt adjustment is a separate procedure. The debtor
files in the court of first instance. The judge examines the debtor's
application and personal circumstances in detail before deciding on the
admissibility of the application. Because most applications are turned
down at this stage (between 1986 and 1989, nearly 80 per cent of the
4 9 Konkurslov, supra note 46, s. 199.
50 The appellate court practice is described in detail in L. Hindborg, Gceldsanering
(Copenhagen: Jurist-og 0konomforbundet, 1991); and G.D. Jensen, Gaeldssanering (Copenhagen:
Jurist-og 0konomforbundet, 1993).
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applications were denied in the first instance court of Copenhagen), this
is also the most important step in the process.
If a case is declared admissible, it is administered by a trustee
who is a private attorney. The costs are paid by the state. The trustee's
obligations include a detailed investigation of the debtor's circumstances
and the preparation of the plan. The creditors are heard, but the court is
not bound by their opinion. The plan confirmed by the court discharges
any part of the debt that is not included in the plan.
It was estimated that 10,000 applications would be filed each
year, but less than half this number were filed in the 1980s. However, the
filings increased in the 1990s and reached 8,000 in 1991. Filings have
fluctuated between 6,000 and 8,000 during the 1990s.S1 The success rate
of applications was remarkably low in the 1980s, only about 25 per cent.
The rate has since risen, but the majority of applications are still
dismissed. Looking at the appellate court practice, the applications of
seriously overindebted individuals are dismissed in some circumstances,
such as unemployment or other severe economic hardship.52 Also,
serious debt problems remain outside the ambit of the adjustment
program.53
E. Finnish Debt Adjustment Legislation
as a Response to a Deep Debt Crisis
In Finland, the deregulation of the credit market took place
more quickly than in many other West European countries. Also, the
recession in the early 1990s was deepened by the decline in trade after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The recession led to a larger increase
in unemployment and bankruptcy filings than in many other countries.
The drafting and enactment of the consumer debt adjustment legislation
can be seen as part of a national crisis management effort. The
legislation was drafted quickly because the Finnish Parliament was
convinced of the need for it, and the law was passed unanimously. The
need for the law was questioned only once, most dramatically by the
51 See Statistiske efterretninger Social Sikring og Terswvesen 1995:8, 1998:11.
52 See J. Niemi-Kiesilinen, Luonnollisen henkil6n velkavastuu insolvenssioikeudessa (Helsinki:
Finnish Lawyers' Association, 1995) (Liability for Debt in Insolvency Law) at 509 [hereinafter
Luonnoisen henkiln].
53 Some critical opinions about the high dismissal rate have been voiced: see H.H.H. Andrup
& J. Meyhof; "Gaeldssanering pa afveje" (1986) Ugeskrift for Retsvcesen 215; M. Munch,
Konkursloven of 1977med kommentarer (1988) 771; and Mogelvang-Hansen, supra note 47 at 90-91.
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president of the Finnish Republic. He delayed signing the law by a
couple of weeks while considering its necessity. The Law on Consumer
Debt Adjustment54 came into effect on 8 February 1993.
The Finnish law provides for a traditional judicial bankruptcy
procedure in the court of first instance; written and oral submissions
from creditors; a judge charged with making decisions in response to
motions from both sides; a trustee to administer the procedure; and
finally the confirmation of a plan.
The law requires the debtor to propose a voluntary payment
agreement to the creditors before making an application to the court.
State funding for counselling has been available as an employment
program for "downsized" bank clerks and social workers. Four-fifths of
debtors receive counselling before they file in court.55 In practice, the
counsellor helps the debtor to negotiate with the creditors and to
prepare documents for court filing. Little time is devoted to economic
planning and the development of budgeting skills.
The access to debt adjustment was designed to take into account
the structural reasons for a debt crisis. An insolvent debtor should show
an acceptable reason for his or her insolvency, such as unemployment,
illness, layoff, or business bankruptcy. Filings that are contrary to the
moral imperative to pay debts are excluded, such as filings by debtors
convicted or suspected of economic crimes, those who have participated
in a speculative business, acted against the interests of the creditors, or
worsened their economic position by voidable transactions. For example,
a number of debtors who invested borrowed money in land and
securities in the late 1980s had their cases dismissed because of the
exclusion of speculative business debts from the law.56 There is also a bar
to a second adjustment. Unlike the American six-year bar, this bar has
no limitation. All exclusion clauses, including the bar to repeat debtors,
are subject to review by the court.
The most important exclusion concerns reckless borrowing or
"reasonable grounds to believe that the debtor has run into debt in an
irresponsible way or with a debt arrangement procedure in mind."5 7
More specifically, the debtor's borrowing is judged by his or her
54 Lakiyksityishenkil6n velkajdrjestelystd (Consumer Debt Adjustment) (25.1.1993/57).
55 See V. Muttilainen, Velkajdrestelyn kustannukset (Helsinki: National Research Institute of
Legal Policy, 1995).
56 See Supreme Court KKO 1995:22. The appellate court practice was unequivocal: see
Luonnollisen henkil6n, supra note 52 at 194.
5 7 See Lakiyksityishenkildn velkajdrjestelysti, supra note 54, s. 10 para. 7.
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prudence in handling finances, the source of the debts, and the
circumstances under which they were incurred. A considerable amount
of case law has evolved around this provision. The bulk of the case law
concerns consumer households with heavy credit card debt, or which
have guaranteed another person's loan. The case law has developed a
bona fide test looking to see whether the debtor knew or should have
known that he or she would not be able to pay debts when they became
due. If the test were applied strictly, a substantial number of debtors who
guaranteed business or housing debts of their family members or
significant others would be excluded. However, the Finnish Supreme
Court changed the practice in a decision giving weight to the
relationship between the primary debtor and the guarantor, the purpose
of the debt, and other circumstances of the case.S8 Cases involving a
large volume of debts or numerous credit card debts have been
dismissed.
The plan is drafted by a trustee appointed by the court and paid
for by the state. The creditors are then heard, but the court is not bound
by the creditors' acceptance of the plan. The maximum duration of the
plan is five years. The plan may exceed five years if the debtor is allowed
to keep a privately-owned home and to pay off the mortgage debt during
the plan. The mortgage debt payments59 may be extended for a period
longer than five years and the interest rate may be modified.
The Finnish law was part of a national strategy of recovery from
the economic misfortunes at the beginning of the 1990s, and has been
quite successful. During the four-year period between 1993 and 1996,
33,000 plans were confirmed, and only 15 per cent of the filings were
dismissed. The law has been criticized on two grounds. Creditors have
complained that the plans yielded payments that were too low. The
administrators complained that too many plans had to be changed
because of changes in the debtor's circumstances. The law was reformed
in early 1997 to exclude temporarily unemployed debtors. 60
58 See Supreme Court KKO 1995:158. The guarantee was given by parents on their children's
business and housing loans, all of them being in the work force at the time: see, further, J. Niemi-
Kiesildinen, "Kvinnoperspektiv pA skuldsanering" (1996) 75 Retfcerd 35 [hereinafter
"Kvinnoperspektiv pA skuldsanering"].
59 The debt is considered secured up to the value of the security when the procedure is
initiated.
60 See Law 22.2.1997/63. Regeringens proposition 180/1996, Hallituksen esitys laiksi
yksityishenkildn velkajdrjestelyst annetun lain muuttamisesta (Bill for the Amendment of the Judicial
Debt Adjustment Act).
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F. Conflict Between the Welfare State and Insolvency Models in Norway
The Norwegian legislative drafting process represents a shift
from a welfare state model of debt adjustment to an insolvency model.
These two concepts were defined in the report of the preparatory
committee, which presented two drafts of a consumer debt adjustment
law in 1991.61 The majority presented what they described as a welfare
state model. They emphasized that the law should prevent serious debt
problems, especially in cases of illness and unemployment, and that
mortgage liabilities should be included in the debt adjustment. They
therefore proposed open access to adjustment, a grace period, and
institutional negotiations between the debtor and the creditors before an
application could be made to the court.
The minority member of the committee, who was a private
attorney, presented a proposal that resembled the Danish Debt
Arrangement Act, and called it an insolvency model. The government
compromised between the two proposals. The grace period and the open
access to debt adjustment were deleted, but the pre-trial procedure was
maintained. The Law on Voluntary and Compulsory Debt Adjustment
for Individuals was enacted on 17 July 1992, and became effective 1
January 1993.62
Access to debt adjustment is regulated broadly. The debtor has
to be permanently insolvent. An overall evaluation of the debtor's
situation takes place, but is guided only vaguely by the law. The
adjustment may not be accepted if it is stotande, that is, against the
general moral obligation to pay one's debts. Experience to date suggests
that this bar will be interpreted narrowly.
The debtor files with the enforcement official who is responsible
for compiling the information about debtors. The enforcement official
forwards the application to the court, which will order a stay of
proceedings against the debtor. During the three-month stay, the debtor
is expected to present a plan, the enforcement official meets with the
creditors and, if none of them objects, confirms the plan. The
enforcement official may appoint an advisor to the debtor. Several new
61 See NOU 1991:16 Gjeldsordningfor personer med betalingsvansker.
62 Lov av 1Z July 1992 om frivillig og tvungen gjeldsordning for privatpersoner
(Gjeldsordningloven).
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jobs were created in the consumer advice offices when the law came into
force.63
The number of uncontested debt settlements has been
disappointingly small. Because the creditors objected, most cases had to
be heard by a judge,64 who can confirm a plan despite the creditors'
objections. The plan's duration is five years, but it may be extended by
the court.
Because four-fifths of Norwegians live in their own homes, and
housing loans are an important reason for overindebtedness, mortgages
are included in the debt adjustment. According to the law, the debtor is
obliged to sell his or her home only if it is in the best interest of the
creditors and the house exceeds the reasonable needs of the debtor's
household.65 Consequently, most debtors can keep their homes in
adjustment proceedings. 66 The interest of the secured creditor is
protected by requiring the debtor to pay the secured debt up to the value
of the house plus 10 per cent in full. The secured creditor must, however,
contend with interest payments during the plan. Down payments on the
principal of secured debt start when the plan is over.
The number of debt adjustments has been modest. During the
first four years, an average of fewer than 1,500 plans a year were
confirmed. 67 The enforcement officials did an effective pre-screening
job. During the first year of operation (1993), more than 22,000 debtors
contacted the enforcement officials, either personally, by phone, or in
writing, but only 4,400 filed for debt adjustment with the enforcement
official. During the first six months, 44 per cent of registered contacts
resulted in dismissal by the authority, withdrawal of the petition by the
debtor, or a decision by the debtor not to file at all.68
63 Ot. prp. nr. 81 (1991-92), Om lov om frivillig og tvungen gjeldsordning for privatpersoner
(gjeldsordningsloven) at 18 (the Norwegian bill for the Debt Adjustment Law) [hereinafter Ot. prp.
nr. 81 (1991-92)].
64 See E. Rokhaug, "Insolvency Legislation: National Experiences" in Helesuo, ed., supra note
17,105 at 107.
65 During the Parliamentary hearings, the minimum needs were replaced by reasonable needs:
see Ot. prp. nr. 81 (1991-92), supra note 63 at 63, 135.
66 It is reported that up to 90 per cent of applicants are allowed to keep their homes: see
Rokhaug, supra note 64 at 107; and H.P. Graver, Gjeldsordningsloven med kommentarer (Oslo: Tano
A.S., 1996) at 115-16.
67 Up to March 1998, 8,000 plans were confirmed: Minister Svarstad Haugland 19 March
1998, in answering a parliamentary question.
68 See C. Poppe, Gjeldsordningslovensforste levear, En evaluering av lovens konsekvenser for
namsmenn, kreditorer og skyldnere (Statens institutt for forbruksforskning Rep. no. 1, 1994) at 109-
10,240-41.
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G. Only Limited Access in Sweden
Surprisingly, Sweden was the last Scandinavian country to
introduce debt adjustment legislation. This may have been because
Sweden had a conservative government (but so did Finland) or is more
prosperous than other countries (although Norway is more prosperous).
Another explanation may be that Sweden had a more active employment
policy and a stronger social security cushion.
The Swedes started the preparatory work well in advance and the
committee's report was published in 1990.69 However, the law was only
given legislative approval in 1994 and came into force 1 July 1994.70 The
delay was due to the opposition within the government. The Minister of
Justice herself opposed the bill, but political pressures finally forced her
to bring it forward.
Access to the debt adjustment program is very narrow. The
Swedish law resembles the Danish law in the narrowness of access and
resembles the Norwegian law in its bureaucratic framework. The bill
emphasized that debt adjustment was to be seen as a benefit and not as a
legal right. For example, the bill avoided the judicial review of debt
adjustment by stating that since the debtor does not have a legal claim to
adjustment, he or she therefore does not risk having a right infringed
upon if the adjustment is denied.71 Also, a broad formulation of the
preconditions to access was justified by the uniqueness of each case,72
requiring a wide discretion by those applying the law.
The policy of granting a discharge only in extremely difficult
situations is evident in practice. Some enforcement agencies have set a
minimum requirement of at least 200,000 Swedish crowns (US$25,000)
in total debts.73 The courts consider the total debt picture, the age of the
debts, the debtor's age, income, and how the debts were incurred. The
6 9 See SOU 1990:74. Skuldsaneringslag.
70 See Skuldsaneringslagen 1994:334.
71 See Reg. Prop. 199311994:123, supra note 22 at 154. Whether this view is consistent with the
procedural safeguards provided by Article 6 of the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, to which Sweden, like other
Scandinavian countries, is a party, is questionable. According to the debt adjustment law, however,
the debtor may bring a claim before the district court if the filing is dismissed by the debt
enforcement agency. Therefore, the regulation as such satisfies the requirements of Article 6 of the
Convention.
72 See Reg. Prop. 199311994:123, supra note 22 at 95.
73 See Utvdrdering av skuldsaneringslagen, Konsumentverket 1995/1996:34 at 18 [hereinafter
Utvdrdering 1995/1996:34].
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discretionary, non-legal nature of debt adjustment is best illustrated by
cases concerning the debtor's diligence in paying the debts. If the debtor
has recent debts, is young and unemployed, has not actively and
diligently tried to reach a voluntary payment plan with the creditors, and
has not sold property such as a house, condominium, or car,74 the case
will be dismissed. 75
More than anything, the debtor's conformity with the rules is
tested by the cumbersome proceedings. The procedure has three tiers
consisting of debt counselling, filing and plan negotiations under the
supervision of the debt enforcement official, and the court hearing. The
debt counselling is not mandatory, but the debtor is required to submit a
voluntary payment plan to his or her creditors before filing. In practice,
most debtors need the advice of debt counsellors. The formal
application is filed with the enforcement official, who helps the debtor to
prepare the plan, submits it to creditors for consideration, and, if it is
unopposed, confirms the plan. Either the debtor or a creditor can submit
the enforcement official's decision to the court.
The layered proceeding has functioned as an effective
gatekeeper. During 1995, the first complete year the law was in
operation, 38,000 households contacted the debt counselling services. 76
Only 8,000 of them were classified as debt adjustment clients.7 7 Nearly
one-half of them (3,800) reached a voluntary agreement with their
creditors.78 The number of filings for debt adjustment with the
enforcement agencies was 4,400 in 1995; 5,200 in 1996; and 3,600 in
1997.79 In 1995, the debt enforcement officials dismissed more than one-
half of the applications, and confirmed less than 300 final plans in
74 The mortgage debt cannot be adjusted. The law is unclear as to when the debtor may keep a
privately-owned home in debt adjustment. Because Sweden, unlike Norway and Finland, has not
promoted home-owning, only a few debtors owned their homes: see ibid. at 17.
75 The first Supreme Court case (HD 1996-05-23) illustrates the argument. The debtor was
male, 29 years old, single and employed. His debts, totalling 700,000 Swedish crowns (US$90,000),
derived from a business he had run for between three and five years before the law came into force.
In affirming the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court held that the insolvency was
qualified, the debts were old enough considering that they were business related, and that the
debtor had tried to reach a plan with the creditors, both before the proceedings and with the
enforcement agency. The discharge was granted. The debtor's failure to submit a brief in the
appellate court was not considered a breach of his obligation to cooperate in the arrangement.
76 See Utvdrdering 19951996:34, supra note 73 at 18.
77 Ibid.
78 Ib L at 32.
79 See Riksskatteverkets statistik 1998.
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1995,80 and 670 in 1997. About 1,000 cases per year have been submitted
to the court, where the dismissal rate has been less than 20 per cent.81
The cumbersome and slow proceedings have been criticized and
the need for two pre-court stages has been questioned,8 2 but the policy
of restricted access is generally accepted as sound.
IV. DISCUSSION
While we can distinguish the European model of debt
adjustment from the Anglo-Saxon concept of consumer bankruptcy, it is
clear that no harmonization of debt adjustment laws has so far taken
place in Europe. The laws differ on such fundamental aspects as how the
access to the adjustment is regulated, which institution handles the cases,
what agency helps the debtors, and whether home mortgage debts are
included in the plan. They are consistent in requiring prior negotiations
with the creditors involving the debt counselling services, providing a
two-tiered formal procedure, restricting access to the proceedings, and
in insisting on a lengthy payment plan.
Udo Reifner has classified the consumer bankruptcy and debt
adjustment laws based on three criteria, namely (1) the right to a fresh
start as opposed to gradual reintegration to financial self-management;
(2) whether the procedure includes a moral judgement on the debtor's
behaviour as a precondition for discharge; and (3) how the
administrative responsibility for the rehabilitation of the debtor and
fulfilment of the plan is arranged.8 3 Based on these criteria, Reifner
constructs four models of consumer bankruptcy and debt adjustment
that he also links to political ideologies.
In Reifner's classification, the fresh start model corresponds to
the American bankruptcy model, and reflects the underlying policy of
the small-business insolvency legislation in the United Kingdom. The re-
educational model is painted by Reifner as a reflection of conservative
80 See Utviirdering 199511996:34, supra note 73 at 36; Utvirdering av skuldsaneringslagen,
Konsumentverket 199511996:31 at 9; and Riksskatterverkets statistik 1998.
81 See Utvdrdering, 199511996:34, supra note 73 at 64; Larsson, Utviirdering av
skuldsaneringslagen 1995/1996:32 at 95; and Riksskatterverkets statistik 1998.
82 See Riksdagens revisorersf6rslag angdende tilldmpningen av skuldsaneringslagen. Fdrslag till
riksdagen 199511996:RR9 at 16 (Parliamentary revision); and Lagutskottets betdnkande 11611997.LU6
Tilldmpningen av skuldsaneringslagen at 11-12 (Parliamentary committee).
83 See U. Reifner, in Overindebtedness of Consumers in the EC, supra note 4 at 116-20.
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Christian values with a social flavour.8 4 Reifner identifies the debtor
according to this model as a "personal and moral failure." The
administrative help model, as presented in the French legislation, offers
state administrative machinery to facilitate agreements between the
debtor and creditors, and, in so doing, invokes governmental pressure on
the banks. The social protection model is concerned with the needs and
situation of the debtor. It is based on the empirical notion that the
consumer debtor's overindebtedness is often due to unemployment,
illness, divorce, and other breakdowns in the family.
Because all European debt adjustment laws emphasize
overindebtedness as a social problem, the need for consumer re-
education and reaffirmation of payment morality, and because they
involve a bureaucratic structure, these aspects are more useful in
distinguishing the European regimes from the Anglo-Saxon bankruptcy
philosophy than in distinguishing the European laws from each other.
The same criticism may be directed at Iain Ramsay, who distinguishes
between three models of consumer bankruptcy based on whether the law
emphasizes the debtor's deviant behaviour, debt enforcement, or the
consumer protection function of bankruptcy.85 In the new European
debt adjustment laws, all three elements are present. They share the
same goals of debtor rehabilitation, consumer education, and upholding
the general debt payment morality. What is significant is that they seem
to prefer somewhat different tools to achieve these goals.
The Scandinavian laws use sometimes cumbersome procedures
and detailed disclosure requirements as educational tools, and rely on
restricted access to the adjustment machinery as a means of upholding
payment morality. The continental laws, on the other hand, emphasize
the importance of debt repayment through a plan, both as a means of
behaviour modification and as a deterrence against "loose" payment
morals. The central importance of the payment plan in the continental
laws is obvious while they, unlike other adjustment laws, give weight to
the creditors' acceptance of the plan, impose minimum payment
requirements, and require longer plans.
84 Thb model corresponds to the German law proposal before the German Parliament at the
time. The proposal was accepted in 1994, but a new chapter on voluntary debt adjustment and
payment plans was added, thus changing the nature of the law.
85 See I.D.C. Ramsay, "Models of Consumer Bankruptcy: Implications for Research and
Policy" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 269.
498
1999] Consumer Bankruptcy: Market Failure or Social Problem? 49!
TABLE 1
FOUR MODELS OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Scandinavian Continental No Discharge
(France)
American
Primary Aim rehabilitation repayment prevention efficiency
Nature of Law debt bankruptcy consumer bankruptcy
adjustment law protection law
law law
Mandatory yes yes no no
Counselling
Filing to enforcement court commission court
agency
Access restricted through broad open
bankruptcy
Exceptions to broad creditor broad fraud
Availability acceptance
Duration of 5 years 7 years moratorium 3 years
Plan
Administrating debtor trustee debtor trustee
Party
Bearer of state debtor state debtor
Costs (waiver)




Bar to forever 10/20 years no 6 years
Subsequent
Filing
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Table 1, above, presents the consumer debt adjustment and
bankruptcy laws, which are reduced to four models in this comparison.
The Scandinavian bills emphasize the rehabilitation of the debtor,86 and
reflect what I have called the social approach to consumer bankruptcy.8 7
The Continental model is based on the German and Austrian laws.
While it shares the concerns of the Scandinavian model, it clearly puts
more emphasis on repayment of the consumer's debts. Control of the
debtor focuses on plan fulfilment, not on how the debts were incurred.
The fundamental difference between Anglo-Saxon consumer
bankruptcy laws and European concerns the notion of the fresh start.
The explicit aim of the European debt adjustment laws, contradictory as
it may seem, is to rehabilitate the debtor and to promote payment of
debts. It is believed that discharge at the end of a five- or seven-year plan
gives the debtor an incentive to disclose his or her affairs, cooperate with
the cumbersome proceedings, and to complete the plan.88 This belief
may be accurate if the alternative is lifelong indebtedness. It is also true
that the debtor has no economic incentive to improve his or her lot
during the lifetime of the plan. The incentive problem, though not
expressed in these terms, emerged when the European countries had to
decide what to do with unemployed debtors. It is often argued that
forgiving a debtor's debts, after a moratorium of five years, when the
debtor has not paid his or her debts, is immoral.8 9 On the other hand, it
can equally be argued that whether a debtor is employed at the moment
of filing for debt adjustment is only arbitrarily related to whether the
debtor is "deserving" or not. Discharge is often hard to get for a young,
unemployed debtor who may need it most, because of the courts'
86 See Reg. Prop. 199311994:123, supra note 22 at 36, and Reg. Prop. 18311993, supra note 23 at
22.
8 7 The Scandinavian model is based on the Swedish and Norwegian laws, and does not reflect
the Danish and Finnish laws accurately. The rehabilitative aim of the law is, however, even more
efficiently realized by the latter laws, since they have bureaucratic layers and less restricted access.
88 The German bill and discussions about it were quite explicit about this. The possibility of
discharge was seen as an incentive to timely filing for bankruptcy, to ensure the debtor's
cooperation in bankruptcy, and to reach more assets in the bankruptcy estate. See
Diskussionsentwurf, supra note 39 at 28-29; Regierungsentwurf, supra note 39 at 82, 86; F. Wenzel,
"Restschuldbefreiung bei Insolvenzen von Verbrauchern" (1990) Verbraucher und Recht 121; and
M. Balz, "Aufgaben und Struktur des kfinftigen einheitlichenlnsolvenzverfahrens" (1988) ZIP 273
at 292.
89 For example, creditors interviewed by the Swedish consumer authority expressed this
concern: see Utvdrdefing av skuldsaneringslagen, Konsumentverket 1995/1996:30.
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reluctance to accept zero-payment plans,90 or because access to debt
adjustment is restricted by law.
The uneasy marriage of morality and economic efficiency is also
evident when considering the results of plans. The average proceeds of
the plans seem to be less than 15 per cent of total debt, and many
debtors are not able to contribute at all.91 It is questionable whether this
low rate of repayment is worth the delay in the debtors' economic
recovery and the loss of economic efficiency it causes. However, it needs
to be emphasized that the rationale of the payment plans is not only
economic but also moral.
The morality that the European countries are trying to foster
goes further than the traditional bankruptcy morality of "the honest but
unfortunate debtor" of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.92 All of the European
laws exclude fraudulent debtors, but they also exclude debtors who have
accumulated excessive debts, worsened their economic position in other
ways, and have made no serious attempts to repay the debts. The
European laws attempt to police the conduct of debtors in a credit
society. Not only fraud but also reckless behaviour is punished. The
educational approach also emphasizes the need for prudent conduct in
the credit market, and counselling is perceived as a necessary tool to
achieve this new morality.
The problems with this approach, especially if applied broadly as
it is in Scandinavia, concern both economic efficiency and fairness. Case
law shows that many debtors with very serious debt problems are left
without a remedy. These debtors are still excluded from the credit
society and their economic efficiency is impaired. When much judicial
discretion is left to the pre-screening authorities, consistency and
fairness become a concern. Even the criteria are suspect. Sheer inability
to handle credit leads debtors in trouble without any malicious intent.
Because these debtors have caused the problem themselves by using an
unreasonable amount of credit, their filings are often dismissed.
However, one is entitled to ask whether the inability to handle credit
really shows that debtors are less deserving than others.
90 See Utvrdering 199511996:34, supra note 73 at 19.
91 For example, in Sweden the plans confirmed by the enforcement officials generated 13 per
cent of the debts and 40 per cent of debtors did not make any payments. In the court proceedings,
the numbers were 4 per cent of the debts, and 75 per cent of the debtors with no payments: see
Utvdrdering 199511996:34, supra note 73 at 36. In Finland, a study found an average payment of 14
per cent: see Tala et aL, supra note 21 at 57; and Muttilainen & Tala, supra note 21 at 40.
92 292 U.S. 234 at 244 (1934).
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Consider the following examples. In Sweden, a couple with a
total debt of 478,000 Swedish crowns (US$80,000) was denied debt
adjustment. They had not suffered a loss of income and they had used
the money to buy household items and a car. They had no income above
the subsistence level. The court reasoned that it would be against
payment morality if they were allowed to go unpunished. Considering
that the couple had seven children, one wonders if a discharge granted
to debtors like them would be likely to undermine the general payment
morality. In Finland, a debtor who had co-signed the consumer loans of
two other persons was denied debt adjustment because he had signed a
loan while unemployed, and should have known that he would not be
able to repay.93 The morality of co-signing a loan often involves factors
beyond the economic rationales the debt adjustment laws are trying to
pursue. Frequently, loans are co-signed by family members, friends, and
even employees, who may consider it a moral obligation. 94
V. CONCLUSION
The European debt adjustment laws were more often than not
introduced by conservative governments. Politically, they are part of a
movement towards a more rigorous market economy in Western
Europe. Simultaneously, the laws were introduced to alleviate the
economic crisis caused by the recession at the beginning of the decade.
In a way, they reflect a new market-oriented social policy. Because of the
recession, the need for such laws was so obvious that the laws met hardly
any opposition at all.
In the bankruptcy context, the laws have been part of a broader
effort to reform the bankruptcy laws to address the needs of a more
liberal market economy. One aspect of this reform policy has been the
reduction of many debt repayment priorities in bankruptcy. Some
countries have abolished practically all priorities, including priorities for
93 See Supreme Court KKO 1995:17. See also "Kvinnoperspektiv pi skuldsanering," supra
note 58.
94 Criticism has been voiced about the broad discretion exercised by the offices in Scandinavia,
but so far it has not led to changes in law. In 1998, a Parliamentary question in Norway, and the
Minister's answer to it, expressed the government's intention to define access to the adjustment
process more accurately than was there the case. For Denmark, see references cited in note 53,
supra.
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taxes, retirement fund payments, and spousal obligations.95 If these two
reforms are combined, the creditors face a trade-off between discharge
of debts and the abolition of priorities for public claims.
Consequently, the fresh start of the European debtor is delayed
by the payment plan; however, when the debtor finally receives it, it
really is a fresh start. All debts are discharged with the exception of child
support obligations. 96
The European experience casts light on some topics in the
American reform discussion. In the European assessment, the
mandatory payment plans work well. However, making a plan work is
neither easy nor free. The design of, and compliance with, mandatory
payment plans usually requires support from professional counsellors.
Most plans do not survive for five years and have to be revised. Often
this requires a whole new procedure, including counselling, consultation
with creditors, and the drafting of a new plan. In Europe, adjustment
plans are considered a good investment, and on completion of the plan
the debtor obtains a fresh start, even if it is delayed.
95 Austria and Denmark had already abolished most priorities before the debt adjustment
laws were introduced. In Finland, these two reforms were explicitly bundled together. In Sweden,
the public claim priorities are still strong, but they are not applied in debt adjustment proceedings.
96 In the United States, it has been argued that the "fresh start" in bankruptcy is not so fresh
anymore: see W.C. Whitford, "Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S. Bankruptcy Law" (1997)
20 J. Consumer Pol'y 179 at 191. Many preferential debts, most importantly taxes and alimony
payments, are excepted from discharge. Also, the debtor may make an affirmation agreement with
one of his or her creditors to pay the debt despite bankruptcy, a widely-used practice.

